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What is the Best Forum For Promoting
Trade Facilitation?
Zviad V. Guruli*
I.

Introduction

The importance of trade facilitation has increased during the last
decade. While many scholars have addressed the significance of the
trade facilitation issue, few have directed their attention to the need for
an appropriate forum. In the context of identifying the necessity for a
new multilateral agreement on trade facilitation to be administered by the
World Trade Organization (WTO), this issue has been hotly debated by
national delegations.'
Trade facilitation covers a variety of measures and activities. For a
complete analysis, however, it is beneficial to examine the trade
facilitation issue from the perspective of one specific field. For purposes
of this examination, trade facilitation will be analyzed from the customs
aspect. The choice of the customs aspect is not random. Customs issues
play a predominant role in the field of trade facilitation. Additionally,
the domestic legislation of many countries regarding trade facilitation is
primarily limited to the customs area. Significantly, the WTO has
focused its work on trade facilitation by concentrating on customs issues,
and several noteworthy international agreements are currently in
existence in this area. Further, the World Customs Organization (WCO)
has played a vital role in promoting simplified customs procedures
throughout the world. The existence of international legal instruments
and the WCO's status as a strong international inter-governmental
organization, are factors that make customs a good model for the analysis
* This paper was written while Mr. Guruli was a fellow at the Institute of
International Economic Law at Georgetown University Law Center, where he was also
completing his LL.M. degree in International and Comparative Law. Mr. Guruli would
like to thank Mr. Richard F. Chovanec for his comments on this paper.
1. For a comprehensive overview of the work done by various international
organizations in the area of trade facilitation, see Brian R. Staples, Trade Facilitation,
available at http://wwwl.worldbank.org/wbiep/trade/papers_2000/Bpfacil.PDF
(last
visited Apr. 29, 2002).
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of trade facilitation.
Identification of a definition of "trade facilitation" is necessary for
this analysis. It may come as a surprise that, despite the amount of
controversy and debate this issue has caused in recent years, there is no
uniformly agreed upon definition. Various organizations and institutions
working in the area of trade facilitation have included diverse activities
under this concept. 2 Frequent use of this term has caused it to become aresidual category for trade issues that are not specifically designated.
In general, trade facilitation is defined as:
the simplification and harmonization of international 'trade
procedures' with trade procedures being the 'activities, practices and
formalities involved in collecting, presenting, communicating and
processing data required for the movement of goods in international
trade.' This definition relates to a wide range of activities such as
import and export procedures (e.g. customs or licensing procedures);
transport formalities; payments, insurance, and other financial
requirements. 3 [emphasis added]
The general definition appears to be a plausible one and, more
importantly, it is adequate for purposes of this paper. In the customs
area, trade facilitation can be defined as increasing the speed of the
processing of merchandise through customs.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the struggle among various
organizations to bring international trade facilitation measures within one
forum's competence. Part II briefly addresses the status quo of trade
facilitation.
Part III examines the most important international
instruments in the area of trade facilitation. Part IV presents a discussion
on a possible forum for trade facilitation that will be best equipped to
adequately confront all potential challenges. Finally, Part V suggests
that countries and international organizations need to formulate a plan of
action that would be acceptable to all parties involved in trade
facilitation.
II.

The Status Quo of Trade Facilitation

In recent years, various factors have contributed to the growing
importance of trade facilitation. The most important of these factors is
2. The term "trade facilitation" can have a broad or narrow definition - the broad
definition encompassing the type of work carried out by UNCTAD (related to the
establishment of national Trade Points), and the narrow definition covering various areas
(under the umbrella of procedural and documentary requirements) that are essential in
facilitating trade. INT'L TRADE CTR. & COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, BusINEss GUIDE
TO THE WORLD TRADrNG SYSTEM 306 (1999) (hereinafter BUSINEss GUIDE).
3. WTO, Overview of Trade Facilitation Work, available at http://www.wto
.org/english/tratope/tradfa e/tradfac2_e.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2002).
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the sharp decrease in tariff levels after the Uruguay Round.4 After this
tariff level decrease and the significant elimination or reduction of nontariff barriers, trade procedures imposed by countries surfaced as the
primary obstacles to trade.
In many regions of the world it is estimated that the cost associated
with trade procedures is higher than the cost of existing tariffs. 5 Recent
studies also indicate that trade facilitation can reduce transaction costs up
to 15 percent. According to the UNCTAD, "the average customs
transaction involves 20-30 different parties, 40 documents, 200 data
elements (30 of which are repeated at least 30 times) and the re-keying of
60-70% of all data at least once.",6 Furthermore, simplified trade
procedures are instrumental in attracting foreign direct investment,
particularly in developing countries.7
Although many international organizations were addressing trade
facilitation issues prior to 1996, the Singapore Ministerial Declaration,
adding trade facilitation to the WTO agenda, was an important
milestone.8 While trade facilitation issues were always addressed by the
WTO, this was the first time that trade facilitation was identified as a
separate topic.
Notably, the9 WTO has recently confirmed its
commitment to trade facilitation.
4. Increased volumes of trade and innovations in the technological field have also
contributed to the increased attention paid to trade facilitation issues. See WTO, A
Training Package, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis-e/eol/e/
wto02/wto2_69.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2002).
5. Usually these costs are associated with "delays at borders, complicated and
unnecessary documentation requirements and lack of automation of governmentmandated trade procedures." Id.
at
Red
Tape
at
the
Border,
available
6. WTO,
Cutting
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist-e/min0l_e/briefe/15 e.htm (last visited
Apr. 29, 2002).
7. See ICC, Acute Business Need for WTO Rules on Customs Modernization,
available at http://www.iccwbo.org/home/newsarchives/2001/customs.asp (last visited
Apr. 29, 2002) (ICC News).
8. The Ministerial Declaration directed the Council for Trade in Goods "to
undertake exploratory and analytical work, drawing on the work of other relevant
organizations, on the simplification of trade procedures in order to assess the scope for
WTO rules in this area."
WTO, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, 96-5316
WT/MIN(96)/DEC (Dec. 18, 1996),
available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_
search.asp (last visited Apr. 29, 2002).
9. Paragraph 27 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration states: "Recognizing the case
for further expediting the movement, release and clearance of goods, including goods in
transit, and the need for enhanced technical assistance and capacity building in this area,
we agree that negotiations will take place after the Fifth Session of the Ministerial
Conference on the basis of a decision to be taken, by explicit consensus, at that session on
modalities of negotiations. In the period until the Fifth Session, the Council for Trade in
Goods shall review and as appropriate, clarify and improve relevant aspects of Articles
V, VIII and X of the GATT 1994 and identify the trade facilitation needs and priorities of
members, in particular developing and least-developed countries. We commit ourselves
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As previously noted, work on trade facilitation has been carried out
by various international inter-governmental and non-governmental
organizations for many years.' 0 Although many of these organizations
have been somewhat successful in their efforts to bring much needed
uniformity, 1 their progress falls short of what today's international
traders desire. These organizations have primarily focused on drafting
various international agreements (most of which are not legally binding).
None have been successful, however, in providing a sole forum, existing
or new, that would amalgamate trade facilitation issues under one
institution and provide an enforcement mechanism.
Although it is undeniable that the existence of these agreements is
essential to solving the trade facilitation issue, it is equally obvious that
simply minting new agreements will not suffice; the lack of a strong
institutional framework could devour the importance of even the most
well-drafted agreement. In an era of increased world trade, identification
of a proper forum for the resolution of these problems is a necessity.
III. Existing International Instruments on Trade Facilitation
As discussed above, the work of most international organizations
with respect to trade facilitation has focused on drafting and
implementing international agreements.
The same approach has
dominated the customs field. The WCO and the WTO have developed a
to ensuring adequate technical assistance and support for capacity building in this area."
WTO,
Doha
Ministerial
Declaration,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/I,
available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/ministe/min0l-e/mindedl e.htm (last visited Apr.
29, 2002).
• 10. Although many international organizations are working in this area, the
following have been more vigorous in their efforts: (a) InternationalInter-Governmental
Organizations - Center for Facilitation of Procedures and practices for Administration,
Commerce and Transportation (CEFACT-UN/ECE), International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), International Maritime Organization (IMO), International
Monetary Fund (IMF), International Trade Centre UNCTAD/WTO (ITC), Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia
and the Pacific (ESCAP), World Bank, World Customs Organization (WCO), World
Trade Organization (WTO); (b) International Non-Governmental Organizations International Air Transport Association (IATA), International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC), International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), International Express Carrier's
Conference (IECC), International Federation of Customs Brokers Association (IFCBA),
International Federation of Freight Forwarders Associations (FIATA), International
Organization for Standardization (ISO), International Road Transport Union (IRU); (c)
Customs Unions, Free Trade Areas and Regional Organizations - Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC), European Union (EU), Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
11. These organizations have launched numerous programs and initiatives that
promote trade facilitation.
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number of fundamental international instruments in the customs area.
While not all of these instruments can be analyzed here, it is important to
identify and discuss the principle instruments related to trade facilitation.
A.

WTO Customs Valuation Agreement
Formally known as the Agreement on Implementation of Article

VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT), the
Customs Valuation Agreement is one of the main WTO instruments in

the customs area.1 2 As the title indicates, the purpose of this agreement
was to implement Article VII of GATT 1994.13 The Customs Valuation

Agreement sets out detailed rules that must be followed by customs
4
administrations to determine the customs value on imported goods.'
Determination of the customs value on imported goods is essential

for calculating appropriate duties. 5 The Customs Valuation Agreement
provides that "[t]he primary basis for customs value under this
Agreement is transaction value."' 6 Article 1 defines the transaction value
as "the price actually paid or payable for the goods when sold for export
to the country of importation.' 7 The Customs Valuation Agreement also
provides that the transaction value may be adjusted as a result of certain
12. The following are other WTO agreements and rules that are relevant for the trade
facilitation issue: Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade; Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures; GATT 1994 - Article V on
Freedom of Transit, Article VIII on Fees and Formalities Connected with Importation
and Exportation, Article X on Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations.
These agreements and rules are not examined in this paper because, although very
important for trade facilitation, they are not as closely linked to the customs area.
13. "Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade laid down the
general principles for an international system of valuation. It stipulated that the value for
customs purposes of imported merchandise should be based on the actual value of the
imported merchandise on which duty is assessed, or of like merchandise, and should not
be based on the value of merchandise of national origin or on arbitrary or fictitious
values. Although Article VII also contains a definition of "actual value," it still permitted
the use of widely differing methods of valuing goods. In addition, 'grandfather clauses'
permitted continuation of old standards which did not even meet the very general new
standard." WTO, A TrainingPackage, availableat http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto e/whatis e/eol/e/default.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2002).
14. As a result of the Uruguay Round, this agreement replaced the GATT Valuation
Code introduced by the Tokyo Round in 1979.
15. Customs valuation also plays an important role for "trade statistics, for
monitoring quantitative restrictions, tariff preferences and for collecting internal national
WCO, The WTO Agreement on Customs Valuation, available at
taxes, etc."
http://www.wcoomd.org/ie/en/topics-issues/Vatuation/val%20public%2Ointro%20E.html
(last visited Apr. 29, 2002).
16. Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr.15, 1994, General Introductory Commentary, Marakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal e/20-val.pdf (last visited Apr.29, 2002).
17. Id. art. 1.
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additions or deductions.1 8
In addition to setting the transaction value standard, the Customs
Valuation Agreement provides for five alternative methods of valuation
in cases when the transaction value cannot be determined: 1) the
transaction value of identical goods; 2) the transaction value of similar
goods; 3) the deductive value method; 4) the computed value method;
and 5) the fall-back method.' 9 Customs administrations are limited to
these five methods when they reject the 20transaction value and these
alternatives must be used in the above order.
Additionally, the Customs Valuation Agreement requires WTO
member states to provide certain safeguards for importers in their
national legislations. These safeguards include the right of importers to
use all available evidence to substantiate the transaction value declared
by them. In addition, importers are allowed to demand a full written
explanation from customs officials when their declared transaction value
is rejected. The purpose of this provision is to provide importers with the
right of appeal to higher authorities within the customs administration, or
to an independent court or tribunal.
Although the Customs Valuation Agreement was developed and is
enforced through the WTO, the WCO plays a key role in implementing
this agreement. The Customs Valuation Agreement established a
Technical Committee on customs valuation under the auspices of the
WCO and granted it the authority to administer the agreement. The role
of the Technical Committee is "to ensure uniformity in the interpretation
and application of the Agreement at the technical level. 2 1
The Customs Valuation Agreement is vital for trade facilitation. By
providing uniform rules, the Customs Valuation Agreement reduces the
risk of customs administrations reaching arbitrary decisions on
valuations of imported goods, which in turn could be a significant nontariff barrier to trade.
B.

WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin

The Agreement on Rules of Origin defines rules of origin as "laws,
regulations and administrative determinations of general application
applied by any WTO Member to determine the country of origin of
goods. 22 Rules of origin are important "to implement measures and
18. Id.
19. The Customs Valuation Agreement provides detailed descriptions of all these
five methods.
20. The order of methods 4 and 5 can be changed, but only at the request of the
importer.
21. See WCO, supranote 15.
22. Agreement on Rules of Origin, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 1(1), Marakesh Agreement
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instruments of commercial policy such as anti-dumping duties and
safeguard measures; to determine whether imported products shall
receive most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment or preferential treatment;
for the purpose of trade statistics; for the application of
labeling and
23
marking requirements; and for government procurement.,
Currently, different countries are using various rules of origin,24 and
some countries apply different rules on imported goods based on the
purpose of the rules. The Rules of Origin Agreement provides for two
sets of rules: 1) rules applicable in the transition period, and 2) rules
applicable after the transition period. It does not provide for rules
applicable to imports pursuant to preferential arrangements.
During the transition period, countries are free to employ different
rules based on the purpose (i.e., administering quantitative restrictions,
labeling, etc.) for which these rules are applied. The Rules of Origin
Agreement, however, requires countries to follow certain principles
during this transition period. 25
Most of these principles (e.g.,

Establishing
the
World
Trade
Organization,
Annex
1,
available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legale/22-roo.pdf (last visited Apr.29, 2002) (ROO
Agreement).
23. WTO, A Training Package, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/
whatis e/eol/e/default.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2002).
24. It is important to note that some general principles (such as value added or tariff
shift) are common to these rules.
25. During the transition period countries must ensure that:
(a) rules of origin, including the specifications related to the substantial
transformation test, are clearly defined;
(b) rules of origin are not used as a trade policy instrument;
(c) rules of origin do not themselves create restrictive, distorting or disruptive
effects on international trade and do not require the fulfillment of conditions
not related to manufacturing or processing of the product in question;
(d) rules of origin applied to trade are not more stringent than those applied to
determine whether a good is domestic, and do not discriminate between
Members (the GATT MFN principle). However, with respect to rules of origin
applied for government procurement, Members are not be obliged to assume
additional obligations other than those already assumed under the GATT 1994
(the national treatment exception for government procurement contained in
GATT Article 111:8);
(e) rules of origin are administered in a consistent, uniform, impartial and
reasonable manner;
(f) rules of origin are based on a positive standard. Negative standards are
permissible either as part of a clarification of a positive standard or in
individual cases where a positive determination or origin is not necessary;
(g) rules of origin are published promptly;
(h) upon request, assessments of origin are issued as soon as possible but no
later than 150 days after such request, they are to be made publicly available;
confidential information is not to be disclosed except if required in the context
of judicial proceedings. Assessments of origin remain valid for three years
provided the facts and conditions remain comparable, unless a decision
contrary to such assessment is made in a review referred to in (j). This advance
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transparency, non-discrimination, review of administrative decisions)
will continue to apply after the transition period.26
The purpose of the second set of rules is to establish harmonized
non-preferential rules to be applied on MFN basis. These harmonized
standards will be product-specific irrespective of the purpose for which
they are used. The Rules of Origin Agreement established a Technical
Committee on Rules of Origin under the auspices of the WCO and
entrusted it with technical work on the harmonization of these rules.
Although the Rules of Origin Agreement has been in effect since 1995,
the work on "Harmonized Rules of Origin," that will be annexed to the
current agreement, is not yet complete.
Labor costs, lower tariffs, and reduced non-tariff barriers have
encouraged many manufacturers to branch their productions throughout
the world. Consequently, the number of goods produced in more than
one country has grown substantially. This, in turn, has increased the
significance of rules of origin in trade facilitation. The use of multiple
rules of origin could circumvent tariff concessions and undermine their
importance.
Thus, the need for uniform rules of origin has also become
27
urgent.

C.

WTO Preshipment InspectionAgreement

Preshipment inspection covers "activities relating to the verification
of the quality, the quantity, the price, including currency exchange rate
and financial terms, and/or the customs classification of goods to be

information on origin is considered as a great innovation of the Agreement;
(i) new rules of origin or modifications thereof do not apply retroactively;
(j) any administrative action in relation to the determination of origin is
reviewable promptly by judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or
procedures independent of the authority issuing the determination; such
findings can modify or even reverse the determination;
(k) confidential information is not disclosed without the specific permission of
the person providing such information, except to the extent that this may be
required in the context of judicial proceedings. See ROO Agreement, supra
note 22, art. 2.
26. Provisions (d) through (k) will continue to apply.
27. According to the WCO, "Harmonization means that a single origin can be
determined for all non-preferential commercial policy purposes. Both private and public
sectors can anticipate being able to know a clear and predictable origin outcome by
application of a single set of Rules of Origin. Customs officers and traders may face a
significant task in implementing the Harmonized Rules of Origin once they are
operational. However, in the long run, the benefits of harmonization will be widely
appreciated in the same way as the Harmonized System Nomenclature." See WCO,
available at
http://www.wcoomd.org/ie/en/topics issues/Origin/origin.html#The%20
Harmonized%2ORules%20of%20Origin%20and%20Trade%2OFacilitation
(last visited
Apr. 29, 2002).
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exported to the territory of the user Member." 28 Governments have been
using preshipment inspection (PSI) companies for the last four decades;
previously, they were used primarily by private importers.
The
Preshipment Inspection Agreement applies to those WTO Members
whose governments are utilizing services provided by PSI companies.29
These countries and PSI companies are referred to, respectively, as "user
members" and "entities." 3
Article 2 of the Preshipment Inspection Agreement imposes the
following main obligations on user members: 1) Non-discriminationcarrying out PSI activities in a non-discriminatory manner; 2)
Governmental Requirements - respecting the national treatment
principle; 3) Site of Inspection - carrying out PSI activities in the customs
territory from which the goods are exported or, if not possible or both
parties agree in the customs territory in which the goods are
manufactured; 4) Standards - performing quantity and quality
inspections in accordance with the standards defined by the seller and the
buyer or, in the absence of such standards, international standards; 5)
Transparency - carrying PSI activities in a transparent manner; 6)
Protection of Confidential Business Information - protecting the
confidentiality of documents received during PSI activities; 7) Conflicts
of Interest - avoiding conflicts of interest among various entities; 8)
Delays - carrying PSI activities without unreasonable delays; 9) Price
Verification - using set guidelines for price verification; and, 10)
Appeals - ensuring an appeals procedure within the PSI entity. In
addition to an appeals procedure in Article 2, Article 4 also requires user
3
countries to provide an independent review procedure. 1
Although the Preshipment Inspection Agreement primarily deals
with user members, it also places obligations on exporting countries.
Article 3 imposes three main obligations on exporting:
1) Nondiscrimination- applying laws and regulations related to PSI activities in
a non-discriminatory manner; 2) Transparency- publishing laws related
to PSI activities; and, 3) Technical Assistance - providing technical
assistance to user members.32
While the Preshipment Inspection Agreement permits WTO
Members to use the services provided by PSI companies, it encourages
user countries to strengthen their customs administrations in order to be
28. Agreement on Preshipment Inspection, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 1, Marakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/21-psi.pdf (last visited Apr. 29 2002).

29.
30.

Id.
Id.

31.

Id. art.4.

32.

Id. art.3.
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less dependent on these companies. One of the problems associated with
the use of PSI companies is the issue of liability. Since PSI companies
are used by governments, importers are unable to bring an action against
these companies. The use of PSI companies, however, also has several
advantages. Not only does it make customs clearance more effective in
those countries where customs administrations are not modernized, but it
also reduces corruption. Reducing corruption is one of the main reasons
why many developed countries are using PSI companies.33
Although countries may limit the use of PSI companies in the
future, the importance of the Preshipment Inspection Agreement cannot
be overlooked. Today, more than thirty countries are using PSI
companies. These companies are performing many functions of customs
administrations. Thus, the Preshipment Inspection Agreement is also
critical for trade facilitation.
D.

WTO Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures

Import licensing is defined as "administrative procedures used for
the operation of import licensing regimes requiring the submission of an
application or other documentation (other than that required for customs
purposes) to the relevant administrative body as a prior condition for
34
importation into the customs territory of the importing Member.
While the Import Licensing Agreement allows countries to maintain
import licensing procedures, 35 it establishes rules that countries must
follow in order to ensure that import licensing procedures do not impede
international trade.
In general, the Import Licensing Agreement provides that "[t]he
rules for import licensing procedures shall be neutral in application and
administered in a fair and equitable manner." 36 Furthermore, it requires
that application and renewal forms and procedures be as simple as
possible.3 7 In addition, rules on import licensing procedures are subject
33. The issue of customs-related corruption has been raised numerous times by
various organizations. Although not binding, the WCO Customs Co-operation Council
Declaration Concerning Integrity in Customs (the Arusha Declaration) is an important
instrument for trade facilitation. It provides for guidelines to be followed by countries in
order to reduce customs-related corruption.
34. Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 1, Marakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal e/23-lic.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2002) (ILP
Agreement).
35. The use of these procedures is limited to certain purposes (e.g., monitoring trade
statistics, administering quantitative restrictions, etc.).
36. ILP Agreement, supra note 34, art 1(3).
37. The Import Licensing Agreement also protects importers in cases of minor
documentation errors and minor variations in value, quantity or weight. See id.
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to a publication requirement.38 The Import Licensing Agreement
classifies import licensing regimes as either automatic or non-automatic.
In the case of automatic import licensing, approval of the application is
always granted. Non-automatic import licensing, as the name indicates,
is a residual category. Although the Import Licensing Agreement creates
specific rules for both categories, the main objective is to avoid traderestrictive or trade-distortive effects.
The Import Licensing Agreement promotes trade facilitation in a
number of ways. First, it minimizes documentation requirements for
importation. Second, it ensures the timely issuance of import licenses.
Third, it makes the licensing process simple and transparent. Finally, the
Import Licensing Agreement limits the number of administrative
agencies handling import license applications. All of these measures
substantially reduce the cost of international trade.
E. Harmonized Commodity Descriptionand Coding System
Most international traders and scholars agree that one of the most
successful international instruments in the customs area is the
International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description
and Coding System (Harmonized System), developed by the WCO.3 9
The Harmonized System entered into force internationally on January 1,
1988.
The Harmonized System is an international product nomenclature.4 °
It provides a uniform structure for tariff classification and, according to
the WTO, most WTO member countries, covering ninety-five percent of
world trade, use the Harmonized System. Although the Harmonized
System is primarily used for classification and valuation, it is also widely
"used by governments, international organizations, and the private sector
for many other purposes such as internal taxes, trade policies, monitoring
of controlled goods, rules of origin, freight tariffs, transport statistics,
price monitoring, quota controls, compilation of national accounts, and
economic research and analysis."' To better achieve uniformity in this
area, the Harmonized System Convention established the Harmonized
System Committee as an international dispute settlement body.
Although the Harmonized System has been extremely successful,
38. See Id.
39. See Harmonized System Convention, available at http://www.wcoomd.org/ie/en
/topics-issues/HarmonizedSystem/hsconve2.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2002).
40. Products under the HS are divided into 96 chapters, 1,241 headings and over
5,000 sub-headings.
41. WCO, Harmonized System Convention - General Information, available at
http://www.wcoomd.org/ie/en/topics-issues/HarmonizedSystem/hsconve2.htin#General
_information (last visited Apr. 29, 2002).
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there are several issues that need to be resolved. The main concern that
has been raised in the WCO relates to the amendment process. This
process requires a minimum of five years. The WCO Secretariat, in its
recent information sheet, has articulated various explanations for this
lengthy process; 42 the complexities posed by both the drafting and
implementation periods, have been identified as primary reasons for this
protracted process.4 3 In addressing various proposed alternatives for a
more expedited process, the WCO cautioned supporters of these
proposals to not jeopardize the uniformity of the Harmonized System by
shortening the amendment process. 44 According to the WCO, this "is a
difficult balance to strike." 45 Furthermore, the WCO emphasized the fact
that this matter is equally important for both customs and trade issues.
As a uniform classification tool, the Harmonized System has
played-and will continue to play-a central role in trade facilitation.
Therefore, it is important that the Harmonized System be more receptive
to a rapidly changing and growing product market. Increased flexibility
of the Harmonized System will better satisfy the needs of international
traders and significantly reduce the costs of international trade.
F.

InternationalConvention on the Simplification and Harmonization
of Customs Procedures

The WCO has assumed the role of a leader not only in the customs
area, but also in the trade facilitation field because its work is closely
related to trade facilitation. Although the WCO has been influential in
passing various international instruments under its auspices, the most
important instrument for the purposes of trade facilitation is the 1973
International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of
Customs Procedures (Kyoto Convention).
The Kyoto Convention underwent a complete revision in 1999
(Revised Kyoto Convention). 6 The purpose of the Revised Kyoto
Convention is to provide countries with a model for customs procedures,
and its structure, consisting of a General Annex and 10 Specific
42.

See

WCO,

Amending

the

Harmonized

System,

available

at

http://www.wcoomd.org/ie/en/topics_issues/HarmonizedSystem/hsreviewrevised.PDF
(last visited Apr. 29, 2002).
43. See id.
'44. See id.
45. Id.
46. The Council of World Customs Organization adopted the revised texts and the
Protocol of Amendment in June 1999. The amendments will be effective as soon as the
Protocol enters into force, which requires the accession of 40 Contracting Parties to the
1973
Convention. "
See
generally, the
Revised
Kyoto
Convention,
http://www.wcoomd.org/ie/en/Topicslssues/FacilitationCustomsProcedures/kyoto/kyrep
ort.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2002)(Revised Kyoto Convention).
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Annexes,47 is significantly different from the 1973 Convention. 4
Contracting Parties must accept and implement the General Annex.
Unlike the 1973 Convention, the Revised Kyoto Convention prohibits
reservations against the Standards and Transitional Standards of the
General Annex.
In addition to the structural reformation, the Revised Kyoto
Convention reflects many substantive changes and additions. These
revisions were caused by the fact that the vast majority of Annexes in the
1973 Convention were outdated and needed to integrate modem
approaches to customs issues. The Revised Kyoto Convention provides
for many of these contemporary customs techniques, the underlying
purpose of which is to promote trade facilitation.
The General Annex to the Revised Kyoto Convention recommends
a number of principles: standard, simplified procedures; continuous
development and improvement of customs control techniques; maximum
use of information technology; and a partnership approach between
Customs and Trade. 49 As the WCO has indicated:
The key elements within the revised Kyoto Convention to be applied
by modem Customs administrations are: the maximum use of
automated systems; risk management techniques (including risk
assessment and selectivity of controls); the use of pre-arrival
information to drive programmes of selectivity; the use of electronic
funds transfer; co-ordinated interventions with other agencies;
making information on Customs requirements, laws, rules and
regulations easily available to anyone; providing a system of appeals
in Customs
matters; formal consultative relationships with the
50
trade.
Again, the purpose of these modifications and additions is to
facilitate international trade. Many important impediments (specifically
structural and enforcement) must be overcome before the Revised Kyoto
Convention can be fully implemented. These impediments will be
addressed in detail in the following section.
47. According to the WCO: "The General Annex is the nucleus of how a modem
Customs administration operates." WCO, Revised Kyoto Convention in 9 Questions,
available at http://www.wcoomd.org/ie/en/Topics Issues/FacilitationCustomsProcedures
/KYOTO AN.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2002) (9 Questions).
48. 1973 Kyoto Convention consists of two parts: (1) The Main Text divided into 19
Articles, and (2) 31 Annexes (each addressing a specific customs procedure in the form
of a Standard or Recommendation). However, the parties are only bound by the Main
Text.
49. See Revised Kyoto Convention, supra note 46.
50. WCO, Customs Role to Facilitate International Trade, available at
http://www.wcoomd.org/ie/en/PastEvents/trade99/kyotoe.html (last visited Apr. 29,
2002).
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The analysis of existing international instruments in the customs
area illustrates several points that are fundamental in dealing with trade
facilitation issues. These points reveal both positive and negative aspects
of work done by two leading international organizations in the trade
facilitation area and stress the need for identifying a single forum that
will be able to build on the past progress, and, also, to adequately deal
with present and future challenges.
First, the history of the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement
demonstrates that cooperation among various international organizations
involved in trade facilitation is not only possible, but also productive.
Entrusting the WCO with the technical aspects of the Customs Valuation
Agreement is a logical allocation of roles. This type of allocation of
functions secures the vitality of the agreement as well as the adequate
participation of relevant international organizations.
Second, the extensive work done on the WTO Rules of Origin
Agreement underscores the difficulty-despite the full participation of
various international organizations-of drafting uniform rules of
application that will be acceptable to all countries. Issues related to rules
of origin are complex and time consuming: the goal is not to simply
introduce new rules but to implement a universal system of rules of
origin. Thus, the interests of efficiency and uniformity must be carefully
balanced before implementing any long-term commitments.
Third, the Preshipment Inspection Agreement underscores the
importance of balancing the needs of developing counties and the
interests of the international trade community. Although it sanctions the
use of PSI companies, it imposes necessary safeguards to ensure that
traders are adequately protected.
Fourth, the current amendment process of the Harmonized System
emphasizes the significance of procedural aspects in an international
instrument. Although the Harmonized System has been tremendously
successful, in today's market the product cycles change in months rather
than years. This creates a necessity for a more expedited amendment
process. A shorter amendment process, however, could weaken the
significance of the Harmonized System. As a result, the need for a new
amendment process also requires balancing the interests of efficiency
and uniformity.
Finally, a review of international agreements indicates that these
instruments do not cover the entire ambit of trade facilitation. While
many issues have been, or are being addressed by international
organizations, many areas are in need of uniform rules capable of
adequate enforcement. This is the primary reason why many countries
and international organizations have been advocating for new
multilaterally binding WTO rules on trade facilitation.
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IV. What Is the Most Viable Forum for Trade Facilitation?
Although there are in excess of fifteen organizations involved in the
area of trade facilitation, not all have expressed a desire, or their
prerogative, to be the ultimate forum for administering the trade
facilitation issue in its entirety.
Actually, the debate has been
concentrated within one international intergovernmental organization the WTO. The main issue has been the identification of WTO's role in
this area. Therefore, in addressing the forum issue, evaluating the role of
the WTO is of primary importance.
A.

ProposedAlternativesfor Trade Facilitation

The trade facilitation issue has been raised in the WTO in two
contexts. Primarily, this issue has been examined by inquiring into the
necessity for new multilateral binding rules in the area. A related inquiry
has been the issue of designating an appropriate international
organization that would be responsible for establishing these rules.
Deciding that the need for new multilateral binding, rules exists
automatically raises the question of an appropriate forum which would
be capable of enforcing these rules. Because these issues are so
intertwined, it is likely that a separate discussion of each would further
confuse the matter.
Three main positions have been identified regarding the trade
facilitation issue. Business Guide to the World Trading System provides
a summary of three positions that different WTO members have taken
during recent meetings:
One position was that predictability and security for exporters and
importers were best guaranteed by establishing a set of multilaterally
binding rules on trade facilitation which would strengthen already
existing disciplines contained in the present WTO agreements; a
number of concrete proposals for future rules in this area were tabled.
According to another view, there was no need for additional
multilateral rules; instead, work on trade facilitation should be left to
other organizations which were already carrying out such work, as
well as to national initiatives which should be supported by technical
assistance and capacity building. A middle position suggested that
the WTO could develop general guidelines or recommendations to
provide political support for trade facilitation initiatives which were
undertaken
elsewhere, both nationally and in other international
51
fora.
Individual assessment of these three approaches is required. The
51.

See BusINEss GUIDE, supra note 2
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complexity of each approach makes it more logical to consider each in
reverse order.
1.

WTO's Role as a PoliticalSupporter

Although the first, so-called "middle position," is an attempt to
bring two opposing views together,52 it presents several problems. First,
it is not clear what the legal basis would be for issuing these guidelines
or recommendations. Even if the Ministers were to agree on this type of
action, it would raise serious doubts as to its propriety. Although various
specific provisions related to trade facilitation currently exist in WTO
agreements, none of them, individually or jointly, provide a mandate for
issuing these guidelines or recommendations for trade facilitation in
general. It could be suggested that these guidelines or recommendations
be issued separately for each individual initiative undertaken outside of
the WTO. However, this individual approach would not solve the
problem of identifying a proper legal basis of action, under existing
WTO agreements, for every area of trade facilitation.
Second, the nature of these guidelines or recommendations indicates
that there would be no adverse consequences for noncompliance. It is
unclear how these instruments would assist trade facilitation initiatives
taken in other international organizations given that the main problem
these initiatives are facing is the issue of enforceability.
Third, this approach deviates from the purposes of the WTO, which
was not designed to provide political support. Mildly put, WTO's
worldwide reputation is very delicate. Specifically, the failure of Seattle
Ministerial was proof of this public relations problem. Therefore,
WTO's exercise of political power could be viewed as the extension of
its dominance, even if its intentions and purposes are beneficial to all
nations. Hence, the WTO should refrain from any attempt to exercise
political power.
Finally, even if all of the noted obstacles were overcome, it is
unclear who the beneficiaries of this political support would be. Most
countries that are members of the WTO are also represented in other
international organizations that conduct work in the trade facilitation
area. It follows; then, that issuing these guidelines or recommendations
would have no practical significance.
2.

The Future of Trade FacilitationOutside the WTO

Supporters of this approach suggest that future work on trade
52. These two positions are best illustrated by differing approaches taken by several
developing countries and the European Community.
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facilitation should be left to other international organizations. This
approach implies two things: first, that these organizations ate capable of
conducting this type of work and, second, that these organizations have
been successful in their efforts in the past. Although the first assumption
is correct and requires no further examination, serious doubts exist as to
the second one. Again, it would be helpful to analyze this approach by
reviewing work done in the customs* area under the guidance of the
WCO. As previously stated, the goal of the Revised Kyoto Convention
is to facilitate trade. Many important impediments must be overcome
before the changes and additions of the Revised Kyoto Convention can
be carried out effectively.
First, the most obvious and least complicated impediment is the
entry into force of the Revised Kyoto Convention. As of July 2000, only
five of the required forty Contracting Parties have acceded to the
Protocol of Amendment, and only. 19 have signed it subject to
Considering the importance of this Convention, these
ratification.
numbers do not seem very promising. The second problem has been
raised by the WCO itself.5 3 It concerns the acceptance (after its entry
into force) of the Revised Kyoto Convention by all WCO members.
According to the WCO:
The Member Customs administrations of the WCO invested 4 years
By
in updating and modernizing this important instrument.
unanimously adopting the revised Convention in June 1999 all 151
WCO Members signaled their approval of these new principles and
rules for simplified and harmonized Customs procedures,54 and with
this their willingness to work towards full implementation.
These two reasons given by the WCO provide little comfort. The fact
that it took four years to make these revisions does not necessarily mean
that all countries are in a position to embrace the final results of the
Revised Kyoto Convention. To the contrary, it can be argued that the
reason it took four years to make these changes and additions is because
not all WCO member countries are ready to implement them.
Furthermore, the unanimous adoption of the Convention has no legal
The history of international
significance for its implementation.
agreements provides many examples in which countries adopted or
signed international legal instruments without any intention and/or
capacity to implement them. Although the intentions of WCO members
in adopting the Revised Kyoto Convention should not be questioned, one
may have doubts as to the capacity of all members to fully implement

53.
54.

See 9 Questions, supra note 48.
See id.
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it.

Third, the most important impediment is the issue of enforceability.
Naturally, this issue has many dimensions. As noted, only the General
Annex must be accepted by Contracting Parties.56 This legal structure
raises an important concern that the WCO has also alluded to: "[c]an a
57
single General Annex really cover every aspect of trade facilitation?"
Unfortunately, various factors suggest that the answer to this question is
no. Many important issues that relate to trade facilitation in the customs
area are covered by these Specific Annexes. Therefore, the General
Annex and the Specific Annexes should have equal legal significance.
However, the current structure of the Revised Kyoto Convention
(although an improvement over the 1973 Convention) requires
Contracting Parties to accede only to certain Specific Annexes. In
addition, it also allows Contracting Parties to make reservations against
the Recommended Practices contained in those Specific Annexes.
Undoubtedly,, this structure is not very instrumental in promoting
uniform customs procedures throughout the world.
There are also several enforcement issues with respect to the
General Annex itself. The General. Annex of the Revised Kyoto
Convention does not reflect anything similar to WTO principles of most
favored nation and national treatment. Absent these principles in the
binding section of the Convention, there is no guarantee that Contracting
Parties will not use customs procedures to protect either their domestic
industries or industries of their strategic partners. It must be underscored
that this possibility is not hypothetical. In today's international trade
arena, many countries use trade procedures to substitute the role that
tariffs and other trade barriers used to play. In fact, this is the very
reason why the importance of trade facilitation has grown in recent years.
In addition, the Revised Kyoto Convention lacks an adequate
enforcement mechanism. The binding nature of the General Annex does
not obviate the need for such a mechanism as no sanctions (similar to the
revocation of trade concessions under the WTO) are contemplated for
countries that fail to implement or violate obligatory standards of the
Convention.
Finally, the Revised Kyoto Convention provides no international
dispute settlement mechanism. This concern was recently raised at the
Open Day For International Trade organized by the WCO for
55. This argument is further supported by the fact that the Revised Kyoto
Convention provides for a three-year transitional period that allows Contracting Parties to
make appropriate changes in domestic legislations.
56. However, it is must be noted that Contracting Parties must also accede to those
Specific Annexes which are applied by their customs administrations.
57. See 9 Questions, supra note 48.
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international traders. According to the WCO:
International trade operators, relying on the right of appeal, and
finding themselves unable to obtain uniform treatment at the national
level in terms of the application of regulations relating to tariff
description, origin and valuation, or even uniform treatment with
regard to the minimum data to be provided to Customs
administrations, called for: 58the establishment of an international
court of Customs arbitration.
The establishment of an International Court of Customs Arbitration
would confront many problems. One such problem was identified during
the Open Day and concerns "the problem of how to reconcile the taking
of binding technical decisions by the WCO with the concept of
respecting national sovereignty . . .59 The Resolution of this issue will
require WCO member countries to pass national legislations which
would grant a broad mandate to this International Court of Customs
Arbitration. Not only would this issue be very sensitive in many
countries (for example, in the United States), but it could take many
years before the national legislators of WCO member countries can agree
on such a mandate.
As the above analysis indicates, there are various structural and
enforcement problems with the Revised Kyoto Convention. This does
not diminish the substantive importance of the Convention. In drafting
new multilaterally binding rules on trade facilitation, the ultimate forum
must rely fully on the Revised Kyoto Convention because it provides the
most effective modem principles and standards for customs procedures.
Nevertheless, the substantive strength of the Convention must be
buttressed with a robust institutional system. Although the WCO has the
needed expertise and experience in the trade facilitation area, it is not
granted an adequate mandate to fully implement the Revised Kyoto
Convention.
This analysis also indicates that other international organizations,
that also lack sound enforcement mechanisms, will have similar
problems in dealing with their respective areas of trade facilitation. In
turn, this reemphasizes the need for identification of an appropriate
forum for trade facilitation.

58. WCO, Summary of Conclusions Open Day for International Trade World
Customs Organization, available at http://www.wcoomd.org/ie/en/Past Events/Summary
%20of%2Oconclusions_Openday.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2002) (Open Day).
59. See id.
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Trade Facilitationand the WTO

Both supporters and opponents of this approach have voiced their
opinions 60 in the WTO Council for Trade in Goods. 61 At the outset, it is
helpful to address arguments submitted by opponents of this position.
The main concern that these delegations have put forth is that "the
problems which developing economies were facing in this area could not
be solved by the introduction of binding commitments subject to the
WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Instead, a vast effort in technical
assistance and capacity building was needed...,62 These arguments are
not particularly convincing for several reasons.
First, the WTO has been actively promoting capacity building and
technical assistance programs for developing countries. This position
was reaffirmed at the WTO Workshop on Technical Assistance and
Capacity Building in Trade Facilitation, which was held in Geneva in
2001.63 In addition to these attempts by the WTO, various countries
have also undertaken "Technical Assistance Programs" in order to assist
lesser developed countries. 64 It is unlikely that new binding WTO rules
on trade facilitation will disrupt this process. In fact, new rules could
potentially have the opposite effect.
Developing countries could
condition their support for new rules on adequate assistance from
developed countries. This would not only force developed countries to
address the issue, but it would also bring more awareness to developing
countries' needs, and speed up the assistance and capacity building
processes.
Second, developing countries' interests are recognized in almost all
WTO agreements. In those agreements, developing countries are given
transitional periods for capacity building purposes. No reason exists for
preventing new WTO rules on trade facilitation from providing a similar
approach.
60. It must be noted that both sides are in agreement regarding the need to
implement existing WTO agreements that are relevant for trade facilitation. See WTO,
Factual Summary of the Informal Meetings of the Councilfor Trade in Goods, 99-1964
G/C/W/153 (May 12, 1999), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gensearch.asp (last
visited Apr.29, 2002)(Factual Summary).
61. See id.
62. Factual Summary, supra note 60.
63. See WTO, WTO Workshop On Technical Assistance and Capacity Building in
Trade Facilitations, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tradfa-e/
tradfacworkshop may0 l_e.htm (last visited Apr.29, 2002).
64. Australia is one of many countries that provide this kind of assistance. See
WTO, Council for Trade in Goods - Delivery of Technical Assistance and Capacity
Building in Trade Facilitation -Australian Customs Experience, 01-2314 G/C/W/263
(July 5, 2001) available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp (last visited Apr.29,
2002).
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Moreover, opponents of this approach have also argued that "many
Members were still grappling with the implementation of certain
commitments from the Uruguay Round, and that these implementation
issues needed to be addressed before consideration could be given to
additional rules. 65 Again, this argument is not very compelling.
No specific arguments have been presented as to why the WTO
should not proceed with its work on trade facilitation while these
countries are trying to meet their Uruguay Round commitments. While it
is possible that many developing countries would be overwhelmed by a
large number of commitments, one must keep in mind that these new
rules are not ready to be introduced any time soon and drafting could
take a substantial amount of time. There is no need to wait for these
countries to meet their Uruguay Round commitments prior to beginning
work on new trade facilitation rules.
In addition, subjecting new rules to the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism raises doubts with respect to the competence of the WTO
Appellate Body and Panels to deal with complicated problems that trade
facilitation issues present. Trade facilitation issues may be complex and
detailed,66 but they are not novel for the WTO dispute settlement
system. 67 Although scholars may disagree on the success the WTO has
had in dealing with these issues, nothing indicates that trade facilitation
issues presented some kind of unusual challenge for the WTO, or that the
record of compliance was low.
Proponents of this approach have also presented various arguments.
They principally rely on WTO's organizational strength for their
65. Factual Summary, supra note 60.
66. For example, the Revised Kyoto Convention contains 600 Standards and
Recommendations and Practices.
67. Messerlin and Zarrouk consider customs procedures and technical regulations
and standards (TRS) as two important aspects of trade facilitation. According to them
"Both components of trade facilitation (TRS and customs procedures) have emerged as
one of the recurrent themes in WTO dispute settlement cases. Cases raised by customs
procedures have involved customs classification, duty collection, GSP coverage, quota
management and import measures. Cases raised by TRS are even more numerous: cases
on tunas and dolphins, shrimps and turtles, beef hormones, and on asbestos focus on this
topic, but provisions from the Uruguay TBT Agreement is invoked in many other
complaints. All these cases involved industrial and developing countries, both as
complainants and defendants. These cases have had (so far) a very different fate,
Cases on customs
depending whether customs procedures or TRS are at stake.
procedures have been kept at their technical level, terminated without too many fights,
and are (so far) followed by compliance of the losing party (or, at least, an official
statement to comply). In sharp contrast, cases involving TRS have generated a lot of
emotion and heat, and compliance to panel rulings seems far to be automatic (in
particular since the EC decision no to implement the beef hormone WTO ruling)."
Patrick A. Messerlin & Jamel Zarrouk, Trade Facilitation: Technical Regulations and
Customs Procedures, available at http://www2.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/Issues/messerlin
.pdf (last visited Apr.29, 2002).
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suggestion that "predictability and security for exporters and importers
[is] best secured with a set of multilaterally binding rules on trade
facilitation. 6 8 They also allude to the fact that when other international
organizations have not been successful in implementing multilaterally
binding rules in their respective areas, the WTO has been
able to
69
effectively intervene and provide a "regulatory framework.,
Although these proponents recognize the potential of a 'bottom-up'
approach, they consider the 'top-down' 70 approach as necessary. 7' This
position is also supported by other international organizations that
believe the best
way to achieve progress in this area is through
72
governments.

While the third approach is generally acceptable, it leaves two
questions unanswered.
The first question concerns the future of
international instruments already in existence. ICC's approach on this
issue illustrates the majority opinion. It suggests that the WTO, in
drafting new binding rules, should rely on the work and experience of
other international organizations.73 It is not clear from this position,
however, what should be done with these instruments once the principles
and standards reflected in them are incorporated into the proposed WTO
agreement.
Once again, it will be helpful to use the Revised Kyoto Convention
to illustrate this point. As a reminder, the Revised Kyoto Convention has
not yet entered into force and only certain parts of it are binding.
One way to approach this issue would be to incorporate the
principles of the Revised Kyoto Convention into a proposed WTO
agreement on trade facilitation and also promote the adoption of the
Revised Kyoto Convention by countries (under the guidance of the
WCO) separate from the WTO agreement.74 (This seems to be the
approach taken by the ICC.)
There are several benefits that this approach could provide. First,
the adoption of the Revised Kyoto Convention would be beneficial for
those WCO member countries that do not belong to the WTO. Second,
drafting the new multilateral agreement could take several years while
the Revised Kyoto Convention is ready to be accepted by countries.
68. Factual Summary, supra note 60.
69. See id.
70. For a detailed discussion of 'bottom-up' and 'top-down approaches, see
Messerlin, supra note 67.
71. Factual Summary, supra note 60.
72. See id.
73. See ICC, ICC Recommendations to WTO Members on Trade Facilitation,
available
at
http://www.iccwbo.org/home/statementsrules/statements/2001/wto_
members on trade.asp (last visited Apr. 29, 2002).
74. The second possible option is addressed in the next subsection.
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Third, the legal nature of the obligations under the Revised Kyoto
Convention and the new WTO agreement would be substantially
different. 75 Finally, the adoption of the Revised Kyoto Convention could
actually promote the introduction of the proposed WTO agreement on
trade facilitation.
Despite several benefits, this approach has a critical drawback. The
possibility of two forums individually administering similar issues would
certainly not promote uniformity. Two factors could contribute to such
an absence of uniformity. First, while incorporating the principles and
standards of the Revised Kyoto Convention into the proposed WTO
agreement, even a minor substantive change could create a possibility of
two conflicting obligations being imposed on parties to both treaties.
Second, conflicting obligations could also arise in cases where two
forums disagree on the interpretation of a certain standard. Considering
the purpose of proposed WTO rules-bringing uniformity to the trade
facilitation area-this disadvantage substantially outweighs all potential
benefits that this solution might provide.
The second related question involves the future role of international
organizations involved in the trade facilitation area. Although supporters
of the third approach, including the ICC, call for closer cooperation
between the WTO and the WCO (and other relevant organizations), they
do not elaborate upon the nature of this cooperation. It is imperative that
once the proposed WTO agreement is finalized, the functions,
prerogatives and responsibilities of each organization are specifically
identified.
4.

OtherAlternativesfor Trade Facilitation

Positions expressed in the WTO are not limited to the three main
approaches discussed above. There are at least two other noteworthy
positions.
First, some delegations suggest that the WTO should implement its
existing agreements related to trade facilitation, and move to other areas
only if problems continue to exist after the full implementation of those
agreements.7 6 There are various problems with this argument.
Although current WTO agreements need to be further
implemented,77 it is undisputed that existing WTO agreements do not

75. This is more of an argument rather than a benefit.
76. Factual Summary, supra note 60.
77. Certain WTO agreements also need to be amended. According to international
trade operators, there is "the need to amend the WTO Agreement on Customs Valuation,
in order to put an end to the differing interpretations made possible by the text of the
Agreement." See Open Day, supra note 58.
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cover all aspects of trade facilitation. Therefore, it is not clear how the
full implementation of existing agreements will solve issues in those
areas of trade facilitation that are not even covered. Furthermore, the
'wait-and-see' approach could be too costly for international trade. If
international traders -wait for complete implementation of existing
agreements, it could be too late to introduce new rules on trade
facilitation.
Second, according to one WTO delegation, "the WTO should
oversee the policy aspects of the Kyoto Convention, including the
dispute settlement procedures, while the WCO should handle technical
aspects of trade facilitation." Although this seems to be an appropriate
division of functions between these two organizations, it does not obviate
the need for multilaterally binding rules. It would be very hard for the
WTO dispute settlement mechanism to apply the Revised Kyoto
Convention in its present form. Direct incorporation of the Revised
Kyoto Convention into the WTO system could create many structural
problems.
PossibleFusion of Various Alternatives

B.

A possible solution to the question of the most viable forum for
trade facilitation lies in various alternatives discussed above. These
alternatives provide a logical framework for future developments in trade
facilitation.
First, it is important to commence work on proposed WTO rules on
trade facilitation. As Stefano Bertasi, an ICC trade expert, has stated,
"the 'need' for these rules is 'acute."' 78 Difficulties associated with
drafting uniform rules, as illustrated by the Rules of Origin Agreement,
must be taken into consideration. These new rules should be based on
work done by other international organizations such as the WCO.
Reliance on existing international instruments would not only shorten the
drafting process, but, it would also secure the inclusion of the most
modern and well-developed principles present in these agreements (such
as the Revised Kyoto Convention).
Second, the existence of two similar international legal instruments
under two different international organizations must be avoided in the
interest of uniformity. If a decision is made to keep the existing
international agreements, the possibility of any conflicting obligations
must be addressed. One way this issue could be resolved is by
incorporating the principles of these instruments into the new agreement
as minimum standards of application to be followed by WTO Member
78.

ICC News, supra note 7.
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Countries, an approach is similar to the WTO Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. This would insure that
these instruments are not completely discarded and will also allow the
introduction of additional principles and obligations under the new
agreement.
Finally, the WTO and international organizations must divide their
functions in administering the trade facilitation area. The WTO should
oversee the policy aspects including the dispute settlement procedures,
while other organizations should handle technical aspects of trade
facilitation. In this respect, the structures of the Customs Valuation and
the Rules of Origin Agreements could serve as models of cooperation.
This type of cooperation would achieve two important goals. First, it
would unite all trade facilitation issues under one forum.. Second, it
would safeguard the participation of. all interested international
organizations in this area.
V.

Conclusion

There are some common "themes" in trade facilitation that are
visible throughout many countries. 7 9 There is a consensus among
countries and international organizations with respect to trade
facilitation's increased importance during the last decade.
These
countries and international organizations. also agree that certain changes
must be made in order to meet the needs of today's world trade.
Notwithstanding this consensus, a uniformly agreed upon plan of action
has not been formulated.
The United Nations Economic Commission, in cooperation with
various international organizations, conducted an International Forum on
Trade Facilitation in Geneva from May 29-30, 2002.80 One of the
objectives of this forum was to "provide input to the multilateral

79. According to the Chairman of the WTO Council for Trade in Goods there are
several such themes: "one theme is that trade facilitation measures are taken by
administrations in response to real world problems such as challenges arising from
increasing trade volumes, stagnant administrative budgets, and greater facilitation
demands from the private sector. Second, the experiences highlight that simplified
official requirements are an important precondition for the application of information
technology. The use of information technology, in turn, is instrumental for the time
saving and efficiency improvements in the customs clearance process which Members
reported.
A third important theme is that simplified procedures and enhanced
transparency benefit in particular small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)." WTO,
chairman's Progress Report (2000) on Trade Facilitation, G/L/425, available at

http://docsonline.wto.org/gensearch.asp (last visited Apr. 29, 2002).
80. See UNECE, Trade Facilitation: Simpler Procedures for World Growth,
available at http://www.unece.org/trade/forums/forum02/index.htm (last visited Apr.29,

2002).
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negotiations on trade facilitation outside the WTO framework., 81 While
it is important to provide this type of input in every international fora,
only one should be overseeing the policy and enforcement aspects of
trade facilitation. It must be underscored, however, that the purpose of
this concentration of power is not to undermine the involvement of other
international organizations. With proper allocation of functions, all
international organizations working in the trade facilitation area will be
able to contribute their expertise and experience.
Although various international organizations have introduced many
important instruments on trade facilitation, there is a pressing need for
additional rules. Again, the purpose of these proposed rules is not to
hinder the acceptance and implementation of existing international
agreements (e.g., the Revised Kyoto Convention). Proposed WTO rules
will not undermine the existing agreements in the trade facilitation area.
With proper drafting, all potential problems of inconsistent obligations
can be avoided.
The trade facilitation issue should be under the authority of a strong
international organization, such as the WTO, with an effective
enforcement system. This organization should be responsible for
drafting new rules that would fill in existing gaps in the area of trade
facilitation.

81.
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